

# Monetary policy and conflicting social objectives

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# Ethical dimensions of monetary policy

## 1) Standard goals of monetary policy

- low inflation
- employment
- financial stability

## What role for the following in monetary policy?

- impact on inequality
- questions of self-determination
- [cross-border externalities; see Reddy, 2003]

## What to do in cases of tension between categories?

# Monetary policy and inequality – the **factual** question

Several transmission channels (cf. Coibion *et al.* 2012):

- Impact via inflation (eg Monnin, 2014)
- Impact via employment
- Impact via role as lender of last resort

Distinction according to policy tools:

- Conventional vs. unconventional monetary policy
- Example: LTROs of the ECB

**Question:** how to arbitrate trade-offs between standard goals of monetary policy and inequality?

# Monetary policy and inequality – the **normative** question

*Five types of arguments about inequality:*

## 1) Rights-based theories

- eg transgression of political rights (=> cap on inequality)

## 2) Needs-based theories

- focus on poverty (sufficientarian accounts)

## 3) Incentive-based theories

- inequality acceptable if it is beneficial (eg Rawls)

## 4) Merit-based theories

- eg incomes out of sync with economic contribution

## 5) Axiomatic models of equality

- still widespread but not sensitive to choice

# Monetary policy and inequality – the **institutional** question

Two basic options:

1) **integrated approach**: standard goals of monetary policy should be part of one and the same objective function

2) **division of labour approach**: the central bank should pursue its traditional mandate while distributive concerns should be taken care of by the central government

- in **theory**, the former is clearly superior
- in **practice**, it is an open question

# Optimal monetary policy – but optimal for whom?

Two constituencies of monetary policy (see Streeck, 2013):

- The **political** constituency: serving the interests of citizens
- The **market** constituency: policy setting is sensitive to the reaction of financial markets => **the market acts as a filter**

Why is this problematic?

What should we do about it?

# Conclusions

- 1) If it can be shown that monetary policy exacerbates inequalities in problematic ways, what should we do about it?
  - compensate through fiscal / social policy?
  - change the mandate of central banks?
  - revisit the "independence" of central banks?
  - ...
  
- 2) If it can be shown that monetary policy responds to pressures from financial markets in ways that undermine the interests of (some) citizens in problematic ways, what should we do about it?
  - change the mandate of central banks?
  - reintroduce capital controls (or an FTT)?
  - coordinate monetary policy between states?
  - ...